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COMMENT ON RECENT CASES
AGENCY-UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL-ELECTIO-JOINDER.- [N.
C.] In a recent North Carolina case the North Carolina Lumber
Company brought an action against the Spear Motor Company
(principal) and R. L. Blalock & Son (agents) to recover the purchase price of lumber and to enforce a lien against the lot and building of the principal. The agents ordered a carload of flooring
from the plaintiff-third person. This was shipped September
11, 1924. There is no definite statement of the date that the plaintiff was informed of the existence of the principal. However, in
the opinion there is a statement that the principal was undisclosed.
There was a settlement 2 between the principal and the agents on
December 8, 1924. Notice and claim of lien were filed and, as
stated, suit followed. On September 14, 1925, the plaintiff-third
party had "judgment by default final" against the agents. Trial
between the plaintiff and the principal occurred at the June term,
1926. The plaintiff moved for judgment at the close of the evidence.
Motion was denied and there was a judgment on a verdict for the
principal-defendant. On appeal the supreme court declared that
there was error "in denying plaintiff's motion for judgment" and
granted a new trial.
Thus far the decision seems to be clear. Uncertainty exists,
however, because the defendant-principal raised the point that
the plaintiff by having a judgment entered against the agents made
an "election" and thus barred itself from a further judgment. The
supreme court denied that the plaintiff-third party had made a
binding election by taking the default judgment.
It was admitted in the opinion that the Supreme Court of
North Carolina had previously held 3 that a third party had made
an election by taking a judgment against an agent and could not
thereafter obtain a judgment against the principal who was undisclosed at the time of the transaction which constituted the contract. There is an attempt to distinguish this decision from the
principal decision under review by the following: "The agency
was not only not disclosed before the action was begun; it was

1. (1926) 135 S. E. 115.
2. The bill for the flooring was presented to the principal by the agent.

Apparently this occurred before the settlement between the principal and
agent was consummated. Yet it is stated that no notice that the plaintiff's
claim had not been paid by the agent was given to the principal "prior to its
settlement" with the agent. If these facts constituted a defense to the plaintiff's claim there is no discussion of it in the opinion and there will be none
here. See Mechem "Agency" (2nd ed.) secs. 1737-1749.
3. Rounsaville v. Insurance Co. (1905) 138 N. C. 191, 50 S. E. 619.
Apparently the plaintiff sued the principal and the agent in the same action,
first got judgment against the agent, and later at the close of the plaintiff's
testimony suffered an involuntary nonsuit as to the principal.
[181]
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denied by Spear Motor Company (principal) in its answer to the
complaint."'
It is true that the Spear Motor Company argued that R. L.
Blalock & Son were independent contractors and not agents. After
due cofigideration the supreme court held, as a "matter of law" that
they were agents and not independent contractors. It is necessary
to qualify the court's statement that the agency was not "disclosed
before the action was begun." The mere fact that the principal
was made a party defendant seems to indicate that according to the
plaintiff's theory there was a disclosed principal at the time the
petition was prepared. The agency was not a disclosed fact only
in the sense that the defendant-principal was denying an agency
relationship at the trial.
Nevertheless, as stated above, the supreme court in the case
under review held that there was no election and gave the following reason: "The plaintiff cannot be held to have made an election,
until the issue involving their relationship, raised by the answer of
Spear Motor Company in the action in which both the agent (sic)
and the principal were defendants, had been determined."-5 This
seems to be a curious and uncertain test of "election." If a judgment is necessary to determine "the issue" and the judgment is
for the 'defendant-principal he is protected and an "election" thereafter -is a meaningless proposition. If the judgment is for the
plaintiff-third party he then has-judgments against the agents and
the principal and has not been compelled to elect up to that time.
Sb far .as appears the result was that the third party could
have ;ued out an execution on either judgment and at the same
time' could have claimed the benefit of its lien on the principal's
lot. One may suspect that the judgment against the agents was of
no practical value. Nevertheless, the result of the case, whatever
its theory, seems to be an approach to the holding of the minority
of the courts as illustrated by the frequently cited Beymer v.
Bonsall.6 While the latter case does not contain any definite statement that the third party sued the agent to judgment after he had
learned of the undisclosed principal, yet it has been taken to stand
for that.7 Upon that basis the holding is that the third party may
also sue the prihcipal to judgment and there is. a statement that
4. 135 S. E. 115, at 118. As a matter of fact there seems to be no such
distinction. In the Rounsazille case the court held in the first place that the
agreement was between the plaintiff and the so-called agent in his personal
capacity. In other words the other defendant (Carr) was not an agent for
the insurance company in the particular transaction. This seems to have
been the main issue at the trial. Indeed it may be said that the holding. of
the court, according to the admission made in the opinion under review, is

only a dictum.

5. '135 S. E. 115, at 118. Is the court thinking of a verdict before judgment as the thing that has determined "the issue"?
6. (1875) 79 Pa. 298.
7. tfdchem "Agency" (2nd ed.) sec. 1759; 23 Harv. Law Rev. 590;
Mechem "Cases on Agency" 345, note; McLean v. Sexton (1899) 44 App.
Div. 520; American Trading Co. v. Thomas Wilson Sons &' Co. (1902) 74
N. Y. S. 718. Cf. 14 Harv. Law Rev. 68.
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satisfaction is the method that the agent or principal must use to
obtain a discharge.
Objections have been offered to this decision because it violated
some uncertain and confused notions about "election" and most
courts have been persuaded to hold otherwise." Writers for law
reviews have had something to say about an equally unsatisfactory
theory of merger.' So far as has been discovered, however, nobody has argued that the result in Beymer v. Bonsall, supra, was
unworkable from the point of view of commercial affairs. Indeed,
if one will accept as a premise that an undisclosed principal should
be held for the contracts of his agent, the decision seems highly
desirable. If so, the result in the North Carolina case at least
approaches one's ideal.'"
There is still another aspect of the decision that requires attention. Is it permissible to sue an agent and his undisclosed principal in the same suit? This problem must be considered from two
points of view. In the first place is there any procedural objection
to making them joint defendants? Secondly, does the rule of
"election" prohibit a suit in which a third person sues both the
principal and agent? These questions will be considered in order.
The procedural problem has received very little attention. All
discussion that has been found assumes or states that the agent
and his undisclosed principal are not jointly liable in the sense that
members of a partnership are jointly liable on a partnership contract at common law. Nevertheless, there is authority that under
code procedure there is only one cause of action and that a third
person properly may proceed against the principal and agent in the
same suit on this one cause of action. But it is difficult to keep this
problem separated from the second problem of "election." They
seem to run into each other.
In McLean v. Sexton'1 T sued P and A to foreclose a mechanic's
lien on P's property. Apparently both defendants demurred separately and appealed separately from interlocutory judgments over8. Lindquist v. Dickson (1906) 98 Minn. 369, 107 N. W. 958 (dictum);
Barrel! et al. v. Newby (1904) 127 Fed. 656; Georgi v. Texas Co. (1919) 225
N. Y. 410, 122 N. E. 238; MecJzem "Agency" (2nd ed.) sec. 1759.

9. 14 Harv. Law Rev. 68; 4 Columb. Law Rev. 221; 17 Harv. Law Rev.

414. See an article by Frank B. Clayton in 3 Texas Law Rev. 384, advocating the idea of merger. But he discards too many decisions as unsound. See
pages 400-402. Merger seems to be a fiction and should not be used if it

leads to undesirable results. There is an attempt to answer Mr. Clayton's

article.

See 98 Central Law Jour. 280. Mr. Brennen & Sons v. Thompson

(1915) 33 Ont. L. R. 465, 22 Dom. L. R. 375, advocates merger.

10. This is contrary to the argument in Barrel et al. v. Newby (1904)

127 Fed. 656, that "election" in this branch of the law is founded on a public

policy that forbids a plaintiff to trifle with the courts. The writer believes
that this is a myth; that the third party wishes satisfaction and is doing all
he can tO secure it; and that artificial barriers should not be set up to prevent him from obtaining satisfaction. It is worthy of notice that in the same
opinion it is stated that "he who pleads election need not show that it would

be inequitable to permit the plaintiff to recover."
11. (1899) 44 App. Div. 520, 60 N. Y. Supp. 871. The nature of the
action here may explain the joinder of both parties.
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ruling the demurrers. The objections were that the causes of
action had been improperly united and that they did not affect both
defendants. The interlocutory judgments were affirmed. The court
announced the following principles: (1) "There is really but one
cause of action"; (2) "It is a mistake to suppose that a principal
and agent can never both be severally liable upon the same contract"; (3) "If they may be sued in separate actions, there is no
who are liable for
good reason why both the principal and agent
12
a debt should not be sued in the same action.'
This decision was followed by a divided court in Tew v. Wolfsohn.'3 It was there repeated that a demurrer would not lie where
T has sued both P and A. Against the objection that causes of
action had been improperly united1 4 it was held that the complaint
stated "but a single cause of action.

1

The same is true of American Trading Co. v. Thomas Wilson
The opinion was written by Clarke, J., in special
Sons & Co.'
term bf the supreme court. Therein he stated: "The multiplication
of defendants does not necessarily increase the number of causes
of action, even though such defendants are not jointly, but merely
severally, liable."
There is a Missouri decision' that may be inconsistent with
the above New York cases. The point of view of the court was
not clearly expressed. The result seems to be definite. T sued
A and two undisclosed Ps in the same suit and had judgment
against the three. On appeal the defendants argued that "election
must be made before suit." The court of appeals, however, affirmed the judgment. It stz ed that defendants' position was that
there was a misjoinder of parties defendant. 7 The answer to
this was that such a defect must be, raised by demurrer. This
procedural difficulty was confused with what is submitted to be
a distinct problem, i. e., "election." For the court stated in two
places that if a demurrer bad been filed the plaintiff would have been
required to "elect."' 8
12. The next sentence in the opinion was: "Both will be discharged by
the satisfaction of the debt, and neither can be discharged without it." This
was a dictum and one that has not stood the test of time in New York. See
Georgi v. Texas Co. (1919) 225 N. Y. 410, 122 N. E. 238.
13. (1902) 77 App. Div. 454, 79 N. Y. Supp. 286. The case reached the
court of appeals. See (1903) 174 N. Y. 272.
14. There is also a statement in the opinion that under the New York
code a demurrer was not available for a misjoinder of parties defendant.
15. (1902) 74 N. Y. Supp. 718.
16. Central, etc., Co. v. Building & Construction Co. (1915) 189 Mo.
App. 405, 176 S. W. 409.
17. With respect to demurrers there is a difference between the provisions of tbe New York code involved in the New York cases, supra, and the
Missouri code. See (1909) Mo. Rev. Sts. sec. 1800. Cf. Belt v. Washington
Power Co. (1901) 24 Wash. 387.
18. Possibly, there may have been further confusion. The opinion contains this statement: "The rule is well settled in such cases that principal
and agent are not jointly liable." If this means that a principal and his
agent are not normally joint contractors there has been no dissent. But it is a
different question whether they may be joined in the same law suit. Cf.
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Finally, the more numerous decisions which deal with the
problem from the standpoint of "election" demand attention. They
are not harmonious. The two points of view may be set forth
by contrasting the opinion by Learned Hand, J., in The Jungshoved"9 with the opinion of Hough, J., in the same case on appeal.
The former in a well considered opinion held that both the agent
and the undisclosed principal may be proceeded against in the same
suit to a final decree which should provide for "a single satisfaction from either or both." There was to be a provision in the
decree that execution should issue against the principal first. However, Judge Hand arrived at his conclusion on the theory that
an action on a warranty is in tort as much as in contract and thus
no "election" is necessary. Whatever may be the justification of
this premise on historical grounds, it is not thought that modem
courts know legal history
sufficiently to make it likely that the
2
idea will be followed.
This decision was modified on appeal in an opinion by Hough,
J. 21 It was ordered that the libel against the agent he dismissed
because the principal was disclosed, during the negotiations which
resulted in the contract. The majority of the court, however, expressed an opinion that if the principal was undisclosed
he and
22
the agent could not be sued in one and the same suit.
There are four New York cases which relate to this problem.
In Mattlage v. Poole23 T sued P and A in the same action. Both
were served but P neither answered nor appeared. The trial court
Sessions v. Block (1890) 40 Mo. App. 569. Suit by T against both A and P.
Trial court required election and T elected to proceed against A. T got
judgment but could not collect. Later T sued P.
Held that demurrer
against T was properly sustained. There is a dictum, however, that T "cannot proceed against both" and "his action against the agent and the principal
jointly was unadvisably brought." See also United, etc., Co..v. Granite, etc.,
Co. (Mo. App. 1922) 245 S. W. 351; Anchor Warehouse Co. v. Mead (Mo.

App. 1916) 181 S. W. 1057.
19. (1921) 272 Fed. 122.
20. This does not mean, however, that the result at which Learned
Hand, J., arrived is undesirable. It is well to mention that the suit was in
admiralty. If this adds any peculiar feature it is not mentioned in the opinion.

21.

(1923) 290 Fed. 733. The majority opinion is criticized in 22 Mich.

Law Rev. 255.

Mayer, J., -dissented from the opinion and apparently agreed

in substance with Learned Hand, J., who wrote the opinion of the district
court.
22. The court stated its point of view most strongly in these words:
"But whenever or however election must or may be made, it is formally and
logically impossible to sue principal and agent in the manner here attempted."
Cf. the following remarks:

"Doubtless both principal and agent may be

made defendants; but if there was an agency, and nothing more, the judgment can never be joint. It results that under any view of the law, and on
the facts as alleged in the petition, the pleader should have been put to his

election in limine." What advantage would there be in suing both the undiscloted principal and his agent if the next step after obtaining service would
be to elect between them? See statement, apparently dictum, in Berry et al.

v.

Chase (1906) 146 Fed. 625.
23. (1878) 15 I-run (N. Y.)

557.
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and remanded.
dismissed the complaint but this action was reversed
'24
It was thought that there had been no "election.
In Cherrington v. BurchelP' T sued P and A in the same suit
and judgment was rendered against both. This result was not
favored by the appellate division, the court saying: "The plaintiff
had the duty to elect after he obtained knowledge of the situation
whether he would hold the husband for the failure to disclose the
principal, or whether he would hold the wife for the act of the
agent." No doubt, it may be inferred from this statement that
the "election" should be made as shortly as possible after the
knowledge is obtained. In this case the knowledge was obtained
before the suit was brought. Thus it may be that the court disapproved of joining P and A in the same action. On the other
hand the decision does not necessarily mean more than that an "election" must be made before judgment is rendered. If so, the "election"
may be postponed until after the evidence has been presented in
court.
Likewise O'Grady v. Howe & Rogers Co. and Thoms20 is

not very decisive. T sued P and A to obtain specific performance.
At the beginning of the trial T moved for judgment on the pleadings against A and the motion was granted. This was followed
by trial and judgment was rendered against P. On appeal, the
court uttered a dictum that if P had made the proper motion it
would have been held that T's conduct in taking a judgment on
the pleadings would have been an "election" to hold the agent
only. However, the point was held to have been waived and the
deficiency judgment against P and A was merely modified so that
an execution would not issue against defendant Thorns "until
the return of an execution therefor against the defendant Howe
and Rogers Company unsatisfied in whole or in part."
In a later case"' the appellate term held that the trial court
erred in directing T to elect whether he would continue his action
against P or A. 28 The court stated that "there can be no doubt that
the plaintiff had the right to unite the agents and their undisclosed
principal as partieg defendant in the suit" and then argued that it
would be unjust to require "election" before trial. 29 Apparent
24. The appellate court offered the following advice: "The plaintiff
may discontinue against O'Donoghue (principal). Strike her name from the
complaint and there remains an undoubted right of action against Poole."
See Montague M. M. Co. v. All Packa.qe G. S. Co., Inc. (1918) 182 App. Div.
500. See also Rosenzweig v. Raubitsohek (1914) 166 App. Div. 448.
25. (1911) 147 App. Div. 16.
26. (1915) 166 App. Div. 552.
27. Schwartz-reich & Goodman Co. v. Quitman et al. (1920) 181 N. Y.
S. 784.
28. T had first sued A alone thinking that A was P. In an examination
before trial A disclaimed acting a's P. Thereupon T 'with leave of court
amended his complaint and joined P and A as parties defendant.
29. "If the plaintiff were so compelled, the plaintiff, in electing to hold
the agent, might be defeated upon the ground that both the agency and the
name of the principal were disclosed, and, if it elected to hold the principal,
the jury might find that the contract was not made for the latter." Cf.
Columbia Graphophone Co. v. Levitan et al. (1924) 209 App. Div. 215, 204
N. Y. Supp. 421.
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approval was given to a passage from Tew v. Wolfsohn, supra,
that an election can not be required until the close of the case.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota3 0 fairly may be said to
have approved of the New York idea3 ' that T may sue A and the
undisclosed P in the same action and that "election" will not be
required-at least where P is denying that he.was such-before T
has put in his evidence.
Illinois has contributed a decision with an apparently practical
result. 2 T sued" P and A in the same suit. P denied joint or
several liability and A denied joint liability. T had judgment against
both defendants. P alone appealed. The appellate court reversed
and remanded the judgment but only "to require defendant in
error to elect whether it will take judgment against plaintiff in
error or L. A. Shadburne, and when it has so elected then to
enter judgment accordingly." This may be said to imply that an
"election" is not required until the time has arrived for the rendition of judgment.38
Texas seems to agree with Illinois in its solution of the problem. In one case, 3 ' T sued A, who answered that there was a
P and named him. T then filed a "supplemental petition" asking
judgment against P and A. The trial court, however, would not
On appeal this was held
permit T to show the existence of P.
to be reversible error, the appellate court adding by way of guidance: "In such a case plaintiff could not recover judgment against
both Roquemore (agent) and Lightburne & Co. for the debt, but,
if plaintiff should succeed in making proof of undisclosed principal
as offered it would have to elect which of the two it would ask
judgment against."
In the second case, 35 T sued A and P in the same suit and
obtained judgment against both defendants. On appeal, this judgment was reversed and the cause remanded for failure of T to
elect. On a motion for rehearing, however, it was held that T
might elect in the appellate court in view of the fact that he had
not been required to elect theretofore. This seems to be a sensible
result for a court that does not wish to follow the Pennsylvania
case of Beymer v. Bonsall.
30. Gay v. Kelley (1909) 109 Minn. 101..
31. As developed in McLean v. Sexton and Tew v. Wolfsohn supra,
which were cited by the Minnesota courf.
32. Limousine, etc., Co. v. Shadburne and Sbarbaro (1914) 185 Ill. App.
403. Cf. Messenden v. Raiffe (1907) 131 Ill. App. 456. But see Kadish v.
Bullen (1882) 10 Ill. App. 566.' It is not very clear but it may be said that
it denies that the principal and agent can be sued by a third party in the
same suit.
33. Other courts, as shoryn herein, seem to insist upon "election" at an
earlier date, such as at the close of plaintiff's case or at the close of all the
testimony.
34. Pittsburgq Plate Glass Co. v. Roquemore (1905) 88 S. W. 449.
35. Ft. Terrett Ranch Co. et al. v. Bell (1925) 275 S. W. 81. There is a
good review of the case in 24 Mich. Law Rev. 298. The decision seems to
depend in part upon a Texas statute.
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There is a decision in Wisconsin"8 which seems in effect to
arrive at the same result as the Illinois decision, supra.
California, also, seems to be committed to the idea that T may
sue both P and A in the same suit,3 T even though an "election" must
be made before judgment is rendered.
On the other' hand there are at least expressions that it is improper for T to make A and the undisclosed P defendants in the
same suit. Indeed, Weil v. Rayond3 s holds that a demurrer to
a bill in equity by T against P and A will be sustained because
he "cannot make both principal defendants in one suit, whether
he charges them conjunctively or alternatively." The "election"
must be3 9 made before suit is started unless separate suits are instituted.

A New Jersey' 0 case involved a suit against two corporations
and two individuals. "Judgment final was entered by default"
against the two corporations. On trial a separate judgment was
rendered against the two individuals. This judgment was reversed
on writ of error. Said the court: "The plaintiff was in doubt
as to who was really Cottentin's principal, the West End Company,
the Cottentin Hotel Company, or Meyer and McKenna. She could
not have believed it to be the joint contract of all four. If Cottentin was in fact the agent of Meyer and McKenna the suit should
have been brought against them alone. If, however, either the
West End Company or the Cottentin Hotel Company was the principal, the suit should have been brought against that corporation
which was in fact liable. It may be that the plaintiff had the
election to hold either one of the corporations or Meyer and McKenna. She sought to avoid making such an election by suing all
parties. She could not prove a joint contract, and up to the time
*when she entered the judgment against the corporations it was still
open to discontinue as to the corporations and to hold Meyer and
McKenna; but by entering that judgment she evinced an election
to hold the corporations and could not thereafter hold Meyer or
McKenna." While in this passage the court seems to direct T
to "elect" before filing suit, still there seems to be no penalty in
mind if T sues both P and A in the same suit. For it appears
;that even if he does that, he may dismiss as to one or the other
at a later stage of the trial. However, the holding of the court
36. Dornfeld v. Thompson (1922) 177 Wis. 4, 187 N. W. 683 (not very
clear when "election" must be made where T has sued P and A in the same
suit nor whether another trial would be required in the particular case.)
37. Montgomery v. Dorn (1914) 25 Calif. App. 666, 670; Ewing v. Hayward (1920) 50 Calif. App. 708 (concurring opinion of Finlayson, P. J.);
Garcia, etc., Co. v. Colvin (1921) 53 Calif. App. 79 (dictum). There is a
statement in M. Brennen & Sons v. Thompson (1915) 33 Ont. L. R. 465, 22
Dom. L. R. 375, that T may, if he wishes, sue both undisclosed P and A in
one action subject to an "election" at the proper time.
38. (1886) 142 Mass. 206.
39. This case gives the impression that T was uncertain of his facts,
i.e., whether one or the other was the agent. Would it be more convenient to
permit T to sue both P and A in one action? What harm would come of it?
40. (1910) 80 N. J. L 48.
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with reference to the default judgment seems to be contrary
to that
1
of the North Carolina court in the case under review.
Whatever may be the state of the authorities, one may venture
to suggest that nothing has been discovered which has caused any
doubt of the feasibility of T's suing A and the undisclosed P in
the same suit. This can be permitted without adopting the theory
of Beymer v. Bonsall, supra. Up to this point the North Carolina
court seems to have a majority of the authorities in its favor. It
was a different and a further result when this court permitted two
judgments to be rendered.
KENNETH C. SEARS.
BEST EVIDENCE-PROOF OF CONVICTION BY CROSS-EXAMINA-

TION.-[Massachusetts] An interesting question under the "best
evidence" rule is presented by a recent Massachusetts case.' The
defendant was prosecuted under a statute increasing the penalty
where the accused had previously been convicted of the same offense. The information charged a prior conviction, but the prosecution did not introduce any record to sustain it. When the defendant took the stand on his own behalf he was compelled to
admit on cross-examination that he had previously pleaded guilty
to a similar charge and paid a fine. The Supreme Court approved
the conviction carrying the increased penalty on the ground that
since the prior conviction could have been proved by the confession
or extra-judicial admission of the defendant, it was equally provable
by his admission on the witness stand, and that by taking the stand
he waived his privilege and subjected himself to cross-examination
on all elements of the offense.
There is suprisingly little authority on the point and apparently none supporting the present holding.
41. Cross & Co. v. Mathews and Wallace (1904) 91 L. T. R. 500,

reached a result in accord with that in New Jersey. It should be noticed,
however, that it was a case of a disclosed rather than an undisclosed princi-

pal. Upon that theory, there was no cause of action, normally, against the
agent. Should the court, therefore, have disregarded the default judgment
against him as the basis of an election? Goodale v. Page (1912) 92 S. C.
413, has some dicta that may be interpreted as requiring an "election" before
suit is brought if T only desires to bring one suit.
In Phillips et al. v. Rooker et al. (1915) 134 Tenn. 457, a judgment
against agents of a disclosed P by confession was held to be an election
which would prevent "a further and final decree" against the principal.
However, the court imputed to T that he had a definite theory by which he
could proceed against the agents. It was suggested that T was attempting to
hold the agents upon their implied warranty of authority or upon the theory
that they had added their own responsibility. Thus, the case may be distinguished from Cross & Co. v. Matthews & Wallace supra.
M. Brennen & Sons v. Thompson (1915) 33 Ont. L. R. 465. 22 Dom. L.
R. 575, is in accord with the New Jersey decision except that the court was
even more strict. Therd T sued P and A together, got default judgment
against A, was granted a motion to vacate judgment and amend as to P. On
appeal, action was dismissed but judgment against A to remain.
1. Commonwealth v. Fortier (1927) 155 N. E. 8.

